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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to our understanding of compliance with mandatory accounting standards. 
Specifically, we examine the efficacy of agency related mechanisms on the degree of compliance with 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 101, Presentation of Financial Statements, by focusing on corporate 
governance parameters (board characteristics and ownership structure) and other firm characteristics. 
Using data drawn from a sample of 105 Malaysian companies listed on the ACE market in 2009, we show 
that overall disclosure compliance is high (92.5%), We employ an ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
model to establish whether selected corporate governance and company-specific characteristics 
(proxying for agency-related mechanisms) are related to the degree of disclosure compliance. Our results 
indicate that only firm size is positively associated with the degree of compliance. The other variables 
consisting of board independence, audit committee independence, CEO duality, the extent of outside 
blockholders’ ownership, and leverage do not show any significant relationship with the degree of 
compliance. These results have important implications for policy because they suggest that whilst 
agency-related mechanisms may motivate compliance with mandatory standards, full compliance may 
be unattainable without regulations.  
 




The foundation of good corporate governance is transparent disclosure. If corporate sector entities do 
not follow the policy of complete and objective disclosure while preparing their financial statements, the 
users of this information do not receive early warning signals about deteriorating financial conditions 
and are therefore unable to make timely adjustments. Suddenly an event may unveil previously 
undetected risk exposure of the corporate sector and trigger panic among the investor community. 
The Asian financial crisis during the period 1997-1998 was partly contributed by deficiencies in 
corporate disclosure or lack of corporate transparency. Mitton (2002) shows that during the 1997-1998 
crisis period, Asian firms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality enjoy higher returns. Mitton 
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(2002) used a crude measure of disclosure quality whereby firm that had a listed American depository 
receipt (ADR) is associated with higher disclosure quality. This, he argues, is either due to mandated 
disclosure requirements of the listing exchange or larger pool of investors spurring increased demand 
for disclosure and increased scrutiny of the firm’s reports.  
In order to highlight the role of disclosure deficiencies in the East Asian financial crisis, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) commissioned a study in the second half of 
1998, led by Rahman. The team reviewed the published financial statements, for the year 1997, of 73 
large corporations and banks in five countries—Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. 
The actual accounting and disclosure practices of the sample companies were used to obtain a picture of 
compliance with International Accounting Standards (IAS).  
Specifically for Malaysia, Rahman (1998) found that compliance with the required accounting and 
reporting practices are mixed which suggest the absence of appropriate enforcement efforts. Most of 
the sample companies disclosed the amounts of inter-company receivables and payables, but there was 
negligible disclosure on lending and borrowing activities with the associates. Most of the sample 
companies did not disclose the amounts of foreign debt either in local currency or in the currency of 
repayment. All the sample companies mentioned the use of the closing rate for translation of foreign 
currency transactions. However, the recognition and disclosure of the amount of foreign currency 
translation gains and losses by almost all the sample companies was not in compliance with 
International Accounting Standards. None of the sample companies disclosed their accounting policy on 
foreign currency risk management. While more than a quarter of the sample companies disclosed the 
amount of derivative financial instruments, none disclosed the extent of risk associated with the 
issuance of these, and no sample company disclosed the other relevant information required by IASs. 
Disclosures were made on various elements of segment information by about two thirds of the sample 
companies. While most of the sample companies disclosed the amount of contingent liabilities, a lesser 
number separately disclosed the amount of guarantees given. There was no disclosure on commitments 
in support of off-balance sheet debt financing.   
In a follow up study commissioned by Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (CAPA), Lambert 
and Lambert (2003) examined the extent to which the accounting weaknesses identified by Rahman 
(1998) have been addressed to improve their disclosure quality thus providing a means to mitigate 
future financial crises. In addition to the accounting issues examined in Rahman (1998), Lambert and 
Lambert (2003) also include four additional disclosures contained in IASs issued since the end of 1997 
and in force as at December 2001 namely IAS 35 “Discontinuing Operations” and IAS 36 “Impairment of 
Assets” which improve the transparency of financial statements for companies potentially subject to 
financial distress, IAS 38 “Intangible Assets” which is likely to highlight deficiencies in capacity to support 
debt especially for a firm in financial distress and IAS 39 which extends the disclosure requirements for 
financial assets and liabilities carried at fair values, supplementing disclosures already contained in IAS 
32 “Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation”.  
The results generally indicate there are marked improvements in disclosure levels, observance and 
compliance with IASs and greater transparency. For Malaysia, there is a relatively low level of 
compliance with foreign currency disclosures and derivative financial instruments. This is largely due to 
the Malaysian standards are silent on recognition, measurement or disclosure requirements on these 
areas, unlike the IASs.  
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We undertake this study to provide a more recent survey on compliance with Financial Reporting 
Standards (FRS) 101, Presentation of Financial Statements. The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) has required all listed companies to comply with FRS 101 since January 2004. However, this 
standard was revised in 2006 and since then, no study has been conducted on the new ACE market 
which was introduced by the Bursa Malaysia on 3 August 2009. As such, this study aims to fill this gap 
and provide new evidence on the effect of the new market structure on disclosure behavior by firms. 
Furthermore we also investigate the cross-sectional variation in compliance level by focusing on 
corporate governance parameters (board characteristics and ownership structure) and selected firm 
characteristics. The year 2009 is chosen because it was the last year before the introduction of the new 
FRS 101 (revised in 2009) which was to be complied by all Malaysian public listed companies starting 
from 1 January 2010. The results of the current study would indicate to what extent the companies are 
ready to comply with the new requirements (starting 2010). The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) has required all listed companies to comply with the new accounting standard which resemble 
closely with the IAS issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) starting from 1 
January 2006. The other reason is due to the various institutional changes that have taken place, 
predominantly the introduction of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Revamped Listing 
Requirements in 2001, the enforcement of IFRSs in 2006 and the new Bursa Malaysia’s board structure 
in 2009 that might improve further the compliance level with Malaysian FRS. The results of this study 
will provide input regarding the current accounting practices of listed companies to the relevant 
authorities such as MASB, Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), Securities Commission (SC) and 
Bursa Malaysia in order to evaluate the level of compliance with the MASB standards. It will also provide 
reference in accounting education and research especially in providing a comprehensive disclosure 
checklist regarding a specific accounting standard for preparers and practitioners. 
The motivation for the study is twofold. First, it extends previous studies by examining the factors 
(company-specific characteristics) that influence the degree of corporate compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements in Malaysia after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) by MASB in 2006. There is therefore the need to identify characteristics of companies that 
complied with the mandatory disclosure requirements and those that did not, so that any educational 
effort can be focused on the latter group of companies. Thus, the study is an attempt to aid policy 
makers in any effort to educate companies on how to provide adequate information for investment and 
credit decision-making after the adoption of the IFRSs. Prior to the introduction of MASB in 1997, only 
two comprehensive studies were undertaken (Tan 1998; Abdul Latiff and Skeratt 1996), during which 
time compliance with the accounting standards was not mandatory in Malaysia. Since the adoption of 
IFRSs in 2006, no comprehensive studies have been conducted to examine companies’ compliance with 
the standards. The studies by Rahman (1998) and Lambert and Lambert (2003) provide insights on 
disclosure levels relating to specific IASs and they use a limited sample size. Rahman (1998) includes only 
15 Malaysian firms whereas Lambert and Lambert (2003) increased the Malaysian sample to 20 firms. A 
limited number of studies examining compliance with specific MASB standards include Wan Hussin et al. 
2003, Ku Nor Izah 2003 and Sharir et al. 2003. They document that the compliance level is generally 
high. We undertake this study to provide a more comprehensive survey on compliance with the first 
accounting standard introduced by MASB in 2006 in line with a similar accounting standard introduced 
by IASB in 2006, which is IAS 101, by examining non-financial ACE listed firms on the Bursa-Malaysia as 
at 31 December 2009. Secondly, while prior studies have examined the effects of several company-
specific characteristics such as company size, company age, liquidity, profitability, industry, and auditor-
type on the degree of corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure, none has investigated the 
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influence of corporate governance parameters (board characteristics and ownership structure) on 
mandatory disclosure. The present study is, therefore, an attempt to fill this gap in the literature. 
Thirdly, on 3 August 2009, one of the significant changes in the Malaysian market structure took place 
when Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board and Second Board were merged into a single board to form the Main 
Market, and the MESDAQ Market became the ACE Market.  The ACE Market – ACE stands for access, 
certainty and efficiency – is different because it is sponsored-driven and opened to companies of all 
sizes and from all economic sectors. In addition, there is no prescribed minimum operating history or 
profit track record requirements for entry to the ACE Market. To date, no study has been conducted on 
the extent of compliance by companies in this new market. As such, the findings of this study will 
provide new insights and inputs to accounting regulators, accounting practitioners, academician and 
general users of corporate reports. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section, section two, describes the 
legislative and institutional structures that impact on corporate financial reporting practices in Malaysia 
and develops the testable hypotheses between disclosure compliance (the extent of mandatory 
disclosure) and six factors (corporate governance and company-specific characteristics). Section three 
describes the procedures used to draw the sample, gather data, measure corporate mandatory 
disclosure compliance levels, and fit the regression equation to the data. Section four presents and 
discusses the results of the statistical tests conducted. Finally, section five summarizes the study, 
highlights the limitations of the study, provides suggestions for further research and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The quality of financial reporting of a company is influenced, to a large extent, by the financial reporting 
regulations of the country the company belongs to (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Financial reporting 
regulation is necessary in order to achieve quality financial reporting. There are several reasons why 
financial reporting regulation is necessary. Based on the rationales from the economic literature Ma 
(1997) for example cited two reasons. First, accounting information is a public good in which any 
interested party can have access to the information. Being a public good, besides shareholders who pay 
for the information, there will be free riders1  who also obtain the information from the financial reports. 
In determining the quantity of information to produce, managers do not take into account the value of 
the information to the free riders. Thus, information is under-produced, and there is a market failure 2 
unless regulation of financial reporting is introduced (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
Second, it is argued that management has more information about the value of a firm than do outside 
investors, or there is information asymmetry. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), companies 
whose share prices are undervalued have the incentive to signal that fact by disclosing more 
information. Overvalued firms, on the other hand, do not provide additional information and this signals 
the fact that the firms are overvalued. The shares of some of the overvalued firms then drop and as a 
result become undervalued. These companies will signal the fact by providing more disclosure, and the 
process continues until the worst performing companies do not signal. However, the signalling activities 
can lead to overproduction of information in financial reports. Part of the information relates to 
historical performance and not to future performance. Thus there is no social benefit obtained. When 
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this happens, the authorities have to interfere and introduce financial reporting regulation to overcome 
market failure.  
However, based on the free-market approach of the agency theory 3, it is argued that there is no need 
for accounting regulations. Under the theory, accounting information is regarded as an economic good, 
and like any other economic good, its optimal production is determined by demand and supply factors 
in the market place. Since market forces can ensure an optimal disclosure it is argued that financial 
reporting regulation is not necessary (Ma 1997). Although this is a sound theory, for some reasons its 
practical application is believed to be limited. In the presence of regulations, this free-market approach, 
however, can be argued to lead to extra disclosure to meet market forces since regulations only cover 
the minimum disclosure requirements. 
The social environment and stage of economic development are also believed to have an influence on 
the financial reporting system of a country (Abdul Rahman, 1998). As the sophistication of the economy 
becomes greater, more regulations are likely to be needed in a country.   
 
2.1 Historical Development of Financial Reporting in Malaysia 
The history of financial reporting in Malaysia is reasonably short. Although the securities industry has 
existed since the 1870s with the presence of British companies in the tin and rubber industries (KLSE, 
1998), the first financial reporting regulation in Malaysia can be traced back only as far as 1940 when 
the Companies Ordinance (amendments) of 1940 was established (Tan, 2000). Further Ordinances 
followed in 1946 and 1956. The Ordinances played a major role in regulating financial reporting during 
the period until the Malaysian Companies Act (based on the Victorian Act 1961) was enacted in 1965. 
Prior to the establishment of the Act, there had been calls for greater regulation in financial reporting. 
Babiak (1966) for instance, drew attention to weaknesses and the absence of uniform accounting 
standards, areas in which improvements were needed.  
The development of accounting standards only began in the late 1970s and most of the accounting 
standards were adoption of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Tan, 2000). A major turning 
point in the history of financial reporting in Malaysia started in the mid 1990s. Since 1995, several major 
events that resulted in significant impact upon financial reporting regulations have taken place. They 
were followed by the enforcement of the Financial Reporting Act 1997 on 6 March 1997 that saw the 
establishment of the MASB and the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF). The outbreak of the 
1997/1998 Asian financial crisis brought about significant development of financial reporting in 
Malaysia. Since then, a number of regulations have been amended and introduced. 
The structure of financial reporting regulation in Malaysia is composed of legislation and requirements 
set by various regulatory agencies, which consists of the government and the private agencies. Table 1 
summarizes the regulatory agencies that make up the present Malaysian financial reporting framework. 
The agencies are involved in formulating authoritative accounting regulations and/or in enforcing these 
regulations. They include the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), which monitors compliance 
with Companies Act 1965, and the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), which issues 
accounting standards. Presently, the Companies Act, MASB standards, Listing Requirements of the KLSE 
and the guidelines of the SC are the major sources of reference for corporate reporting in Malaysia.  
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Table 1 




Companies Commission of Malaysia 
(CCM) 
2002 Administers Companies Act 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) 
1997 Sets accounting standards 
Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) 1997 Oversees MASB’s performance, and 
financial and funding arrangements 
Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) 1993 Regulates capital market 
Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) 1973 Monitors securities market 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
(MIA) 
1967 Regulates accounting profession 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 1959 A central bank, and regulates the 
financial institutions and insurance 
companies 
Malaysian Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (MICPA)4 
1958 A professional accounting body 
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development 
Prior studies suggest that corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure is influenced by certain 
company-specific characteristics (e.g. Cerf, 1961; Wallace et al. 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; McNalley et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke 1989, 
1991, 1992; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). The characteristics considered include size, listing status, leverage, 
profitability, dispersion of stock ownership, industry, type of auditor, and country of origin. Overall, 
these studies indicate that size and listing status are significantly associated with the level of disclosure. 
Findings regarding the relationship between level of disclosure and other corporate variables have been 
mixed (see Street and Gray [2001] for a review). 
In this study, the influences of some of these characteristics, namely, board independence, audit 
committee independence, CEO duality, the extent of outside blockholders’ ownership, firm size and 
leverage on mandatory disclosure compliance levels of Malaysian listed companies are investigated. In 
this section, several relational conjectures, based on economic theories, prior results, and a priori 




The board of directors could effectively delineate the rights and the interests and responsibilities of the 
various stakeholders in the company (Ho and Wong, 2001). Nonetheless, the characteristics of the board 
of directors have been the focus of research, which determines its independence and thus influence its 
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effectiveness. Two important board’s characteristics are board independence and the separation of the 
board chairman and CEO (e.g. Shamsul Nahar and Norita, 2004; Ho and Wong, 2001, Kosnik, 1987 and 
1990; Weisbach, 1988).  
Theory on the importance of the board of directors in protecting the various stakeholders’ interests is 
mainly derived from the agency theory (Jensen, 1993; Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The theory predicts that the representations of outside independent directors on the 
board lead to greater the board incentives to fulfill their monitoring roles. Thus, this would translate to 
the board effectiveness. Evidence, however, is mixed (Weisbach, 1988; Beasley, 1996; Shamsul Nahar 
and Norita, 2004; Shamsul Nahar, 2006; Norman, Mohd Mohid and Takiah, 2004). Thus, outside 
representations do not necessarily translate into board effective monitoring.  
In the Malaysian context, several studies have been carried out to examine effects of board 
independence on its monitoring effectiveness. The earliest work was by Annuar and Shamser (1994) 
who examine the wealth effects of the announcement of outside directors. Their evidence shows that 
the announcement does not have any significant impact on the share price of the relevant companies. In 
a subsequent study by Shamsul Nahar (1999), a positive influence of board independence on earnings 
quality is documented. In another study, Shamsul Nahar and Norita (2004), focusing the period during 
the financial crisis but before the implementation of RLRs, show that board independence is not related 
to accrual management. Norman et al. (2004), examining the period after the crisis and after the 
implementation RLRs, find that board independence does not influence accrual management. Norita 
and Shamsul Nahar (2004), investigating distressed companies after the crisis and the period before and 
at the early implementation of RLRs, do not show any significant influence of board independence on 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. Shamsul Nahar (2004), extending further the study on the 
determinants of distressed status, also finds that board independence does not explain significantly the 
financial status of a firm. In a related study, Shamsul Nahar, Junaidah and Rokiah (2004) also do not find 
a significant influence of board independence on the choice of accounting for goodwill. Shamsul Nahar 
(2004) also fails to show the link between board independence and firms’ performance.  
Extant evidence of board independence on the board’s monitoring effectiveness suggests that the link is 
not significant. Perhaps, the insignificant findings are due to two reasons. First, existing studies focus on 
voluntary items which provide discretion to management and the board may not be interested to 
interfere. The present study, on the other hand, focuses on the mandatory requirements on the aspect 
of compliance with MASB FRS 101 standard.   
Therefore, it is expected that board independence plays an important role in ensuring the management 
to comply with MASB approved standards in preparing the company’s accounts. This is because failures 
to comply with the standards could lead to negative publicity which adversely affect their value in the 
labor market. Further, outside directors are seen by the public as “decision expert and decision 
ratifications” (Fama and Jensen 1983). Being at center of the corporate governance, board 
independence is expected to be associated with compliance with the MASB standards. Second, the 
period the present study is interested in is financial year 2009, which is about eight years after the 
implementation of RLRs. One of the requirements of RLRs is directors’ training to enable directors to 
enhance their capacity to discharge their duties. Therefore, it is expected that during the period of this 
study, independent directors have attended this course. Thus, we predict that this translates into 
compliance with the MASB standards. Hypothesis relating board independence and compliance is as 
follows: 
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H1: Board independence leads to higher level of compliance with MASB standards. 
 
As discussed earlier, board’s monitoring incentives are affected by whether the roles of the board 
chairman and CEO are separated or combined. Combining these two roles leads to the present of 
dominant personality (Collier, 1993). Further non-executive chairman promotes a higher level of 
corporate openness (Miller, 1997). Thus, combining these roles could disrupt the flow of information to 
the public as argued by Ho and Wong (2001), this leads to the Chairman-CEO withholding unfavorable 
information to outsiders. Forker (1992) also finds that CEO duality negatively associated with the quality 
of share-option disclosure in the annual reports. The Cadbury Report (1992), the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 2001) and the Hampel Report 
(1998) are supporting the separation of the top roles to ensure the that appropriate check and balance 
system exists.  
Daynton (1984) argued that having a board chairman who is also the firm’s CEO impairs the board 
independence. Rechner (1989) also argued that the ideal corporate governance structure is one in which 
the board is composed of a majority of outside directors and a chairman who is an outside director. She 
stated that the weakest corporate governance is one where board is dominated by insider directors and 
the CEO holds the chairmanship of the board. When one person dominates a firm, the role of 
independent directors (i. e. outside directors) becomes “hypothetical” (Rechner, 1989; Daynton, 1984). 
Rechner (1989) claimed, “… this structure is likely to function as a rubber stamp board given the total 
control of the CEO" (p. 14). A structure of this kind will lead to the board being incapable of protecting 
the interest of the shareholders. The board, with the high influence of the management, will not be able 
to discipline the management appropriately as the management who controls the board will over-rule 
such initiatives. Evidence in the UK and US, on the other hand is mixed (e.g. Berg and Smith, 1978; 
Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Chaganti et al, 1985; Baliga et al., 1996). 
Several studies have thus far been carried out to determine the effect of the separation of the board’ 
monitoring effectiveness and the evidence is mixed. Shamsul Nahar (1999) shows that combining the 
roles leads to lower earnings quality. However, in a subsequent study, Shamsul Nahar and Norita (2004) 
do not find evidence relating CEO duality to accrual management. Norman et al. (2004), on the other 
hand, show that CEO duality leads to higher earnings management. This evidence is consistent with the 
evidence offered by Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004), who find that CEO duality is associated with 
lower amount of voluntary disclosure. Evidence from Ho and Wong (2001), using Hong Kong data, on 
the other hand do not find a significant influence of CEO duality on the amount of voluntary disclosure. 
Ho and Wong (2001) argue that the insignificant association could be due to the fact that the board 
chairman-CEO is also the substantial shareholders. Thus, they argue, it is not important whether the two 
jobs are separated or combined. 
Theory of dominant personality leads to the negative association between CEO duality and compliance 
with MASB standards. However, empirical studies, both in Malaysia and in developed countries 
including Hong Kong and Singapore, show mixed evidence. Perhaps, the positive effects of separating 
the two roles are negated by the slow of decision making processes which are better handled and much 
quicker if the two roles are combined. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: CEO duality leads to low level of compliance with MASB standards. 
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Audit Committees 
Audit committees are sub-committee of the board of directors whose responsibilities are to oversee the 
financial reporting processes of their firms. Collier (1993) argues that audit committees help to ensure 
the financial accounting and control system. Forker (1992) also postulates that audit committees could 
effectively improve the internal control and thus could serve as a device to improve a firm’s disclosure 
quality. His evidence, nevertheless, fails to support the contention. The evidence by McMullen (1996), 
on the other hand, supports the contention of a positive and significant link between audit committee 
and reliable financial reporting. A study in Hong Kong by Ho and Wong (2001), nonetheless, show no 
association between audit committee and the amount of voluntary disclosure. 
Empirical studies on the monitoring incentives of audit committees in Malaysia have generally produced 
mixed results as well. Shamsul Nahar and Abdul Latif (1997) found that audit committee independence 
is not associated with its effectiveness while having a qualified accountant is associated positively with 
its effectiveness. In a subsequent study, Shamsul Nahar and Ku Nor Izah (1999) fail to show the 
importance of audit committee independence nor having a qualified accountant. Shamsul Nahar (1999) 
also fails to show a significant influence of audit committee independence on the earnings quality. In a 
subsequent study, Shamsul Nahar and Norita (2004) do not find evidence of the influence of audit 
committee independence on the accrual management. On the amount of voluntary disclosure, Norita 
and Shamsul Nahar (2004) also do not find evidence of the role of audit committee independence. 
Insignificant influence of audit committee independence and having qualified accountant on the audit 
committee is also found by Norman et al. (2004).   
The relation between audit committee independence and having a qualified accountant on audit 
committee on the compliance with MASB standards is predicted to be positive and significant. The 
reason is that compliance with MASB standards is mandatory and failure to comply could have 
significant adverse impact on the reputation of independent audit committee members and their 
professional accounting bodies. Thus, the next hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Audit committee independence is positively associated with compliance with MASB standards. 
 
The presence of outside blockholders is expected to have significant impact on the compliance with the 
MASB standards. This is because these outside blockholders could demand more information to be 
disclosed in the annual reports to ensure transparency and to reduce information asymmetry among the 
small shareholders. The evidence by Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004) supports this contention where a 
positive and significant influence between outside blockholders and the amount of voluntary disclosure. 
Further, Shamsul Nahar (2004) finds that outside blockholders are negatively associated with financial 
distressed status. It is therefore predicted that the extent of ownership by outside blockholders leads to 
compliance with MASB standards. This is because the wealth of these outside blockholders is tied with 
the value of the firms. Any deviations from MASB standards lead to auditor to issue a qualified report 
which could adversely affect the market valuation of the shares of the firms. Thus, the extent of outside 
blockholders’ ownership provides a greater incentive for compliance with MASB standards. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is as follows: 
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A large number of studies on financial disclosure attempted to associate the extent of disclosure with 
specific attributes of a company. Several company attributes have been examined in previous disclosure 
studies to explain the variations in the extent of disclosure. These include variables that are associated, 
for example, with structure (size and capital structure), performance (profitability and growth), 
corporate governance, and culture of a company. The most frequently examined attributes have been 
corporate size, profitability  and capital structure (Ahmed and Courtis 1999).   
 
Firm Size  
In numerous disclosure studies, size has persistently been found to have a positive association with the 
extent of annual report disclosure (Cerf 1961, Buzby 1975, Firth, 1979, McNally et al. 1982, Naser 1998, 
Daniel et al. 2007). Cerf (1961) provided a comprehensive discussion as to why size is hypothesised to be 
positively associated with the extent of disclosure. He argued that larger firms are more conscious of the 
needs of investors. They are likely to be in the public eye and more subject to shareholders’ and 
analysts’ pressures. Moreover, accumulation and dissemination of information is costly and smaller 
firms might not find it worthwhile. Larger firms which are argued to have better internal reporting 
would have the information ready for management to be adequately informed. It is also argued that a 
high level of disclosure would place smaller firms in a competitively disadvantageous position. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this study hypothesises that the size of a firm is positively associated 
with the extent of disclosure. This study measures size by the total assets of a company, a measure used 
in a large number of studies (e.g. Singhvi 1968, Buzby 1975, McNally et al. 1982, Tai et al. 1990, Wallace 
et al. 1994, Hossain et al. 1994, and Schadewitz and Blevins 1998). The hypothesis to be tested is: 
H5:  There is a positive association between the level of compliance and size of a company. 
 
Capital Structure  
From the perspective of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that higher bonding costs 
would be incurred by firms that are highly leveraged. As financial disclosure is used for monitoring 
purposes, it is expected that firms that are highly leveraged would disclose more information in the 
quarterly reports. Thus, the relationship between leverage and the extent of disclosure is expected to be 
positive. Nevertheless, previous evidence shows that the results were inconclusive. Some studies 
showed a significant relationship (e.g. Courtis, 1979 and Hossain and Adams, 1995 in annual report 
studies; and Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998 in interim report studies), while others found no relationship. 
(e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994, and Daniel et al. 
2007 in annual report studies). 
541 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT, ECONOMICS 
AND FINANCE (ICMEF 2012) PROCEEDING 
 
15th - 16th OCTOBER 2012.  HILTON HOTEL,  KUCHING,  SARAWAK,  MALAYSIA 
ISBN: 978-967-5705-09-0.   WEBSITE:  w w w . g l o b a l r e s e a r c h . c o m . m y  
 
Based on the argument provided by agency theory, this thesis hypothesizes that highly leveraged firms 
disclose more information in the annual reports compared to the lowly leveraged firms. Various 
measures of leverage have been adopted in the literature, depending on the objective of the analysis 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995). Leverage could be measured in terms of book value (for example, the ratio of 
the book value of total liabilities to book value of total assets, and the ratio of book value of debt to 
book value of equity) or market value (for example, the ratio of market value of debt to market value of 
equity). This study measures leverage in terms of the ratio of debt to total assets, as employed by 
Courtis (1979) and Chow and Wong-Boren (1987). Because some companies were insolvent and had a 
negative amount of equity5, measuring leverage as debt to equity ratio might be misleading. From the 
foregoing discussion, the following hypothesis is to be tested: 
H6:  There is a positive association between the level of compliance and leverage of a company. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Data Collection  
This study focuses on the last year (2009) before the implementation of the new FRS101 in 2010. As at 
31 December 2009, there were 134 companies listed on the ACE market (Bursa Malaysia, 2010). These 
companies were classified into four major sectors (industrial products, trading/services, technology, and 
finance). Since this study investigates factors that may influence the level of compliance by non-financial 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia for the year 2009, the finance sector was excluded from the 
study as these companies have to follow specific disclosure requirements and therefore do not have the 
same comparable characteristics, such as sales, as non-financial companies (Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
Following the exclusion of the finance companies (22), the remaining number of companies that were 
eligible for the analyses was 112.  A letter was sent to each of these companies requesting a copy of 
their audited annual report for the financial year ended December 2009. One hundred and five 
companies responded, giving a response rate of 94%. For the other seven companies, they were new 
companies being listed on the ACE market in January 2010 and their annual reports were only available 
for the year 2010 onwards. As such, these seven companies were excluded, thus giving a final sample of 
105 companies comprising of consumer product (1), industrial product (19) trading/services (18) and 
technology (67) companies. The data for all corporate governance and company-specific characteristics 
were obtained or computed from the annual reports of the companies in the sample. 
 
3.2 Research instrument  
This study focuses on Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 101, Presentation of Financial Statements. 
This standard contains 128 paragraphs with 105 disclosure items6. The basis of determining whether a 
particular item is required for disclosure is by looking at a sentence in a paragraph that contain the 
words ‘shall disclose’, ‘shall present’,  ‘present information’, ‘shall be disclosed’ or any other words that 
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3.3 Measuring Compliance 
3.3.1 Level of Compliance 
To determine the extent of compliance, this study assumes that the level of compliance is associated 
with the level of disclosure in the annual reports. A dichotomous procedure as adopted by Cerf (1961) 
will be adopted. Similar procedure was subsequently used by other researchers (e.g. Naser et al. 2002; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ku Nor Izah and Shamsul Nahar, 1998; A. Rahman 1998). It is a simple approach 
by which an item scores ‘1’ if it is disclosed, and ‘0’ if it is not disclosed. The total disclosure (TD) score 
for a company is computed as follows: 
              m 
  TD  =   di 
              i=1 
  where d = 1 if the item di is disclosed, 
             d = 0 if the item di is not disclosed, and 
                                 m  n ( discussed below) 
 
It should be noted that scoring is not a straightforward task since there were cases where companies did 
not mention an item of disclosure because the item is not relevant to them. If that was the case, a non-
disclosure was not considered as a penalty. In contrast, if a relevant item was not disclosed, a score ‘0’ 
was assigned, which thus constituted a penalty. In deciding whether an item was of relevance to a 
company, several procedures used in prior literature were applied. First, following Cooke (1989), each 
annual report was thoroughly read to ascertain whether an undisclosed information item was, in fact, 
irrelevant to a company. Second, as in Owusu-Ansah (1998, 2000), the comparative figures for each 
information item disclosed in one year's annual report; say 2009, was crosschecked against the 
preceding (2008), and succeeding (2010) annual reports. Third, by deductive reasoning, relevance of 
some information items to every company was easily established. For example, when a company has 
fixed assets, its depreciation policy is expected to be disclosed. 
As in prior studies, the content validity of the disclosure checklist was conducted by comparing it with 
the guidelines issued by a Malaysian Big-4 audit firm. Thus, using this auditor's internal checklists or 
guidelines for statutory audit as a referent, each of the disclosure items devised for this study was 
revised. The disclosure checklist was applied to the financial reports of each company, and the relevant 
mandated information items disclosed therein numerically scored. In addition, a Pearson product-
moment correlation analysis was employed, as in prior studies, to test the reliability of the checklist 
after the annual reports have been scored to assess the subjectivity inherent in the scoring process. The 
present investigator scored the annual reports in the first instance, and then, another two persons 
independent of the study were requested to score a randomly selected sample of 10 annual reports for 
the same year. The reliability test was conducted on the scores obtained by these independent persons 
and those of the investigator. The inter-scorer coefficients are significant at the conventional levels, 
suggesting a minimal subjectivity in scoring each annual report for the presence of the mandated 
information items. 
A number of earlier studies however adopted a procedure in which qualitative items were rated 
according to their degree of specificity (e.g. Buzby, 1974). Such an approach would produce a scale of 
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disclosure, which varies between ‘0’ and ‘1’. Nevertheless, the allocation of scores was reported to be 
highly subjective because when user preferences were unknown, different classes of users would likely 
assign different weights to similar items (Cooke, 1989). Consequently, this method was not applied in 
this study.  
Some of the earlier studies assigned weights to the disclosure items according to their importance to the 
users of financial reports (e.g. Buzby, 1974; Wallace, 1988; Chew and Lee, 1990). However, the 
disclosure items used in this study were not weighted because it was assumed that each item of 
disclosure was equally important. This assumption is expected to be valid since this study deals with only 
mandatory disclosure, where all items that are required by the standards are regarded as of equally high 
importance. In contrast, it would have been better to have the items weighted if they had been 
voluntary in nature. 
An index was subsequently developed to measure the relative level of disclosure by a company. The 
index is a ratio of the actual scores obtained by a company to the maximum score possible. Since 
companies are not penalized for not disclosing irrelevant items, the maximum score (M) a company 
could earn varies: 
                                    n 
  M =   di         (1) 
           i=1 
 
 where d = expected item of disclosure, and 
 n = the number of items which the company is expected to disclose. 
 
The total disclosure index (TDI) for each company then becomes TD M. The index would thus lie 
between 0 and 1. A score of 1 indicates that a company disclosed all the relevant items as required by 




Descriptive analysis was conducted for each standard in order to determine the pattern of accounting 
and disclosure practices. Next, multiple regression analysis was employed to test the determinants of 
the disclosure comprehensiveness. 
 
The estimated multiple regression model takes the following form: 
 
TDI =  + 1BDIND + 2CEODL + 3ACIND + 4OUTBLK + 5SIZE  + 6 LEV  +  .   (2) 
        
TDI  : Total Disclosure Index;   
BDIND  : percentage of independent directors on the board; 
CEODL : a dummy variable, “1” if the roles of the board chairman and CEO are combined, “0” 
otherwise; 
ACIND : a dummy variable, “1” if all members are independent directors, “0” otherwise; 
OUTBLK : cumulative percentage of shares owned by outside blockholders with shareholdings 
2% and  above; 
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SIZE : natural log of book value of total assets;  
LEV : total debts divided by total assets; 
                : disturbance term. 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Extent of Compliance 
4.1.1. Disclosure Level of the sampled companies 
Table 2 presents a distribution of the sampled companies according to the level of their compliance with 
the MASB disclosure requirements. Distribution was computed for every sector and for the total 
sampled companies. In line with the framework of analysis used by Ali et. al (2004) and Samaha and 
Stapleton (2008) a distinction is made between four levels of company compliance with MASB 
requirements. The categories are: high compliance, if the disclosure index is 80% or more, intermediate 
compliance between 60% and 79%, low compliance between 50% and 59%, and below 50% which 
reflects a substantial gap between company disclosure practices and the MASB requirements. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of sampled companies according to their level of compliance with FRS101 
Disclosure level range (%) IP CP TECH TS Total sample No. (%) 
           
Over 90% 12 1 50 13 76 (72%) 
80% - 90% 4 - 21 4 29 (28%) 
70% - 79% - -  - - 
60% - 69% - - - - - 
50% - 59% - - - - - 
Less than 50%  - - - - - 
Total 16 (15%) 1 (1%) 71 (68%) 17 (16%) 105 (100%) 
Max. disclosure level  100 91.11 100 100 100 
Min. disclosure level  84.09 91.11 82.5 83.33 82.5 
Overall disclosure level  92.51 91.11 92.34 93.18 92.49 
IP-Industrial Product; CP-Consumer Product; TECH-Technology; TS–Trading and Services 
 
Given the results presented in Table 2, and the above compliance level framework, the first note is that 
all sampled companies in all industry sectors were found to have at least 82% compliance level. This 
result suggests that Malaysian companies listed on the ACE Market of Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock 
Exchange) complied with the majority of MASB disclosure requirements, with the lowest disclosure 
index of 82.5% for the companies in the technology sector. 
Table 2 also shows that about 72% of the sampled companies have a disclosure level of more than 90% 
and 26% have a disclosure level between 80% and 90%. This result indicates that most of the sampled 
companies meet the high compliance level of the compliance framework used by Ali et al. (2004), and 
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the majority of these companies are from the technology sector. Seven companies achieved the highest 
level of disclosure score of 100%. Overall, the average compliance rate was quite high at 92.5%. 
These results indicate that most Malaysian companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia comply with the 
disclosure requirements as required by the MASB standards. This reinforces the usefulness of evaluation 
of the factors influencing companies' compliance with MASB-required disclosures. 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 (Panel A and B) reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in Equation 2. Panel A shows 
that some variables are highly skewed, and hence they were transformed as follows: Size (total assets) 
using natural logarithm, and leverage using cosine.. According to Snee (1973), standardizing variables 
also offers the following benefits: (i) it converts data to a common scale, (ii) it improves precision of 
regression estimates, and (iii) it reduces collinearity problems among independent variables. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Continuous Variables (n = 105 firms) 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness 
Outblk  29.25 25.00 0.00 88.21 21.78 0.381 
Bdind  0.46 0.43 0.25 1.00 0.14 0.874 
Ceodl 0.44 0.00 0.0 1.0 0.50 0.253 
Acind 0.47 0.00 0.0 1.0 0.50 0.136 
Score 0.92 0.93 0.83 1.00 0.04 -7.396 
Size 52243248 38478828 196280 73500000 85142737 6.510 
Lev 0.37 0.32 0.00 3.85 0.42 5.630 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous (Dummy) Variables (n = 105 firms) 
Variable N = 0  N = 1  
Ceodl 59 (56.2%) 46 (43.8%) 
Acind 56 (53.3%) 49 (46.7%) 
 
 
4.3 Bivariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents the Pearson and Spearman product-moment pairwise correlation coefficients between 
the independent variables. The results in Table 2 provide no indication that an unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity is present in the data. Gujarati (1995, p. 335) suggests that harmful levels of 
multicollinearity are present when bivariate correlations reach 0.80. In this study, no correlation 
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Table 4 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation below (above) diagonal  for variables in regressions 
 Outblk Lev Bdind Ceodl Acind Score Size 
Outblk 1 -.083 .044 -.061 -.035 .062 .061 
Lev -.094 1 -.002 .235** -.052 .114 .141 
Bdind .049 -.061 1 .067 .435** .083 .028 
Ceodl -.043 .215* .036 1 .213* .079 -.088 
Acind -.058 .032 .409** .213* 1 -.055 -.081 
Score .056 .014 .023 .073 -.066 1 .209* 
Size .028 -.246** .062 -.091 -.089 .153 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
Overall, there is a concern that the somehow high level of correlation might affect the regression 
estimation results. To identify whether this has been the case, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
calculated for each independent variable in the multiple regression model.  
Although there is no clear cut rule for what value of the VIF should be cause for concern, it has been 
suggested that collinearity is considered a problem when the VIF value exceeds 10 (Neter et al., 1989; 
Mendenhall and Sincich, 1989). None of the independent variables (results not presented) have a value 
exceeding 10. The highest VIF calculated was 2.034 for LEV, suggesting no serious problem in 
interpreting the regression results. Regression results are presented and analyzed in the following 
section. 
The results of our regression analyses are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 reports the results for models 
(1) and (2), with the disclosure score as the dependent variable. As firm size can proxy for many other 
variables, so we conducted two multiple regressions. Model (1) includes all variables while model (2) 
excludes the size variable.  
The board independence (BDIND) variable has a positive relationship with TDI but is not significant. The 
result does not support Hypothesis 1. This shows that the requirements for directors to undergo training 
to enable them to enhance their capacity to discharge their duties has been effective, in the sense that it 
has been translated into a high compliance with the MASB standards. This finding supports prior studies 
by Shamsul Nahar (1999), and Shamsul Nahar and Norita (2004), Kent and Stewart (2008) and Al-Akra et 
al. (2010), but did not support the significant and positive results found by Chen and Jaggi (2000) and 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006).   
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) that CEO duality (CEODL) leads to low level of compliance with MASB 
standards is not supported and not in the hypothesized direction (negatively related) to TDI. This finding 
is inconsistent with the evidence offered by Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004), who find that CEO duality 
is associated with lower amount of voluntary disclosure; Norman et al. (2004) who find that CEO duality 
leads to higher earnings management; as well as by Chau & Gray (2010) and Daniel et al. (2007) who 
find that and independent CEO is associated with higher amount of voluntary disclosure. However, it 
supports the findings of Ho and Wong (2001) who find no significant influence of CEO duality on the 
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amount of voluntary disclosure, and also supports the findings of Kent and Stewart (2008) and Wan 
Izyani Adilah and Zunaidah  (2010) who find no significant influence of CEO duality on the amount of 
mandatory disclosure. The current finding may reflect that decision making processes are better 
handled and much quicker if the two roles are combined, rather than to be separated. 
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) that audit committee independence is positively associated with 
compliance with MASB standards is not supported by the data. In addition, the result shows a negative 
relationship. This finding supports prior studies by Shamsul Nahar and Norizah (1999), Shamsul Nahar 
(1999), and Shamsul Nahar and Norita (2004) and Kent and Stewart (2008). The explanation for the lack 
of highly significant relationship between independence of a corporate audit committee and the extent 
of compliance may be as noted by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993, p. 27), establishing an audit committee is 
one thing: establishing an effective audit committee is quite another. Indeed, prior research has shown 
that key audit committee characteristics (such as independence from management, expertise of 
members in the areas of accounting and financial reporting, and frequency of meeting) rather than the 
mere existence of an audit committee critically impact the audit committee's ability to effectively 
execute its objectives and responsibilities (Abbott and Parker 2000, 2001; Beasley et al. 2000; 
Raghunandan et al. 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2003). 
Firm size (S1ZE) variable shows a positive sign relationship with TDI as expected, but is not significant. 
The SIZE variable was expected to have a positive sign, given the economies of scale in the production 
and dissemination of information, which postulates a direct relationship between company size and the 
extent of compliance. The lack of statistical significance of the SIZE variable is due to high compliance of 
Malaysian companies with MASB disclosure requirements irrespective of whether they are small or big 
companies in terms of total assets. Since the sample of this study consists solely of publicly held 
companies; hence, size effect will be more difficult to detect by any statistical test. 
 
Table 5: Regression Results – All firms 
  Model 1   
 
Model 2   
 Variable 
Predicted 
signs Coefficients t-values Sig. 
 
Coefficients t-values Sig. 
(Constant)  0.811 11.656 0.000  0.908 35.542 0.000 
Outblk + 0.070 0.706 0.482  0.068 0.676 0.501 
Bdind + 0.042 0.386 0.700  0.056 0.510 0.611 
Ceodl - 0.103 0.997 0.321  0.101 0.970 0.335 
Acind + -0.089 -0.796 0.428  -0.107 -0.956 0.341 
Size + 0.155 1.485 0.141     
Lev + -0.015 -0.145 0.885  0.028 0.276 0.783 
R2   0.043    0.021  
Adj. R2   -0.016    -0.028  
F   0.733 0.624   0.433 0.825 
Outblk is the cumulative percentage of shares owned by outside blockholders with shareholdings 2% and above; 
Bdind is the percentage of independent directors on the board; Ceodl is a dummy variable, 1 if the roles of the 
board chairman and CEO are combined, and 0 otherwise; Acind is a dummy variable, 1 if all members are 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise; Size is natural log of book value of total assets;  Lev  is total debts divided 
by total assets. 
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The hypothesis that the extent of ownership by outside blockholders (OUTBLK) leads to higher level of 
compliance with MASB standards is also not supported by the data. However, it is in the hypothesised 
direction. This evidence is consistent with that of Broberg, Tagesson and Collin (2010) who find no 
association between dispersed ownership and voluntary disclosure, and inconsistent with that of Norita 
and Shamsul Nahar (2004) who find a positive and significant influence between outside blockholders 
and the amount of voluntary disclosure.  
The other variable that shows a negative relationship (but not significant) with TDI is leverage (LEV). This 
finding support the findings in prior studies by Courtis (1979), Chau & Gray (2010) and Hossain and 
Adams (1995) in annual report studies; and Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) in interim report studies.  
We also conducted additional analyses by removing nine companies having outliers from the ‘size’ 
variable. Table 4 reports the results for models (3) and (4). Model (3) includes all variables while model 
(4) excludes the size variable.  
 
Table 6: Regression Results – Firms with outliers removed 
  Model 3   
 
Model 4   
 Variable 
Predicted 
signs Coefficients t-values Sig. 
 
Coefficients t-values Sig. 
(Constant)  65.128 5.075 0.000  89.285 46.397 0.000 
Outblk + 0.127 1.249 0.215  0.120 1.161 0.249 
Bdind + 0.140 1.284 0.203  0.135 1.215 0.228 
Ceodl - 0.090 0.857 0.394  0.076 0.713 0.478 
Acind + -0.110 -0.982 0.329  -0.120 -1.048 0.298 
Size + 0.215 2.050 0.043     
Lev + -0.034 -0.320 0.750  -0.089 -0.863 0.390 
R2   0.095    0.052  
Adj. R2   0.034    0.000  
F   1.560 0.168   0.996 0.425 
 
Table 3 shows that firm size (S1ZE) in model (3) has a positive significant relationship with TDI as 
expected (at the 5 per cent level). This finding support the findings in prior studies by Courtis (1979), 
Hossain and Adams (1995), Daniel et al. (2007), Chau & Gray (2010), Broberg, Tagesson and Collin 
(2010). However, no significant associations exist between disclosure score and all the other 
independent variables in models (3) and (4).  
In summary, the empirical analysis suggests that only size is the most a critical explanatory factor of the 
extent by which Malaysia-listed companies complied with MASB accounting standards. The other 
variables consisting of board independence, audit committee independence, CEO duality, the extent of 
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5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The purpose of this study was to empirically investigate the relationships between six factors (corporate 
governance and company-specific characteristics) and the extent of compliance with MASB accounting 
standards by companies listed on the ACE market of Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange) for the 
financial year ending 2009. The empirical results indicate that firm size is the only factor that could 
explain the degree of corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in Malaysia. All the 
other five variables show insignificant relationship. The results of this study provide empirical evidence 
that Malaysian companies irrespective of their different characteristics tend to provide a high 
compliance with the disclosure requirements imposed by the relevant regulatory bodies.  
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that larger companies tend to provide greater compliance 
with MASB accounting standards compared to smaller companies. Therefore, policy makers in Malaysia 
may focus more on small companies in any educational effort to prepare these companies in the 
country about their external reporting responsibilities once the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs) are fully adopted in the country in 2012. 
The results of this study are subject to several limitations. First, while extensive efforts were made to 
develop an accurate proxy for the extent of compliance with accounting standards, the assumption that 
each disclosure item may represent the degree of compliance, as evidenced by the dichotomous scoring 
of the items, is subject to some degree of subjectivity. The disclosure of the same items by companies 
but located in different sections of their annual reports makes the comparison much more difficult. In 
addition, the number of non-applicable items also varies between different companies in different 
industries, which in turn affect the scoring of disclosure items. Second, the results may not be 
generalizable to all companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia), as the empirical 
analysis is limited to only those Malaysian companies listed on the ACE market. Third, given the 
exceedingly complex nature of corporate disclosure, there are inherent limits in the ability of empirical 
research to capture all the factors that influence disclosure decisions made by managements of 
companies. Finally, the regression analysis does not resolve issues of causality. The observed 
relationships between the company-specific characteristics and the extent of compliance do not 
necessarily prove causation. Kerlinger (1973. p. 393) cautioned, "...the study of cause and causation is an 
endless maze. One of the difficulties is that the word "cause" has surplus meaning and metaphysical 
overtones. Perhaps more important, it is not really needed." Consequently, the coefficients of any 
significant company-specific characteristics in the regression equation should not be viewed as 
elasticities that predict how much the extent of compliance will change following a change in any of 
those characteristics. Rather, the estimated coefficients evaluate the strength of the partial correlation 
between the characteristics and the degree of compliance. Although the observed relationships 
reported in this study do not establish causality, Graziano and Raulin (1997) argue that they serve two 
functions. First, any consistent relationships found in the data can be used to predict future events, 
which is one of the stated motivations for this study. Second, it provides data that are either consistent 
or inconsistent with some currently held scientific theory. 
Several new directions for future research are suggested by the research design of this study. First, the 
relatively low adjusted R-squared in some cases suggest that there are several missing variables not 
factored into the estimation. Thus, in addition to those characteristics investigated in this study, the 
relationships between multiple-listing status, internationalization of operations and affiliation with 
multinational corporations, other important financial ratios, and company age should be investigated in 
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future studies. Second, this study could be replicated using cross-national data. For example, data from 
Malaysia could be compared with those from other ASEAN or Asian countries, as these countries have 
similar accounting infrastructure and have had changes in the financial reporting regulatory regimes. 
Finally, a longitudinal approach could be used to investigate the degree of compliance over a long period 
or for a certain period before and after the effective implementation year to examine the trend or 




  A free rider is a person who does not purchase the public good since he is assured of the supply once it is made available to 
the public. 
2  According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), market failure exists when accounting information produced in the absence of 
regulation is nonoptimal in a Pareto sense, or because the market for financial information results in resource allocation 
which is inequitable, that is, “unfair” to some groups or individuals. 
3
  Agency theory assumes a relationship between the principal (owner) and agent (manager) in which the agent manages the 
wealth of the principal. In such a relationship, information from the agent is desired by the principal in order to monitor the 
agent’s behaviour as well as to motivate the agent to act in the principal’s interest. 
4
  Formerly known as the MACPA. 
5
  In Malaysia, a KLSE listed company whose equity is negative is classified as a Practice Note 4 (PN4) company.  
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